_Confines of Democracy_ is a collection of critical assessments and interpretations of Richard J. Bernstein’s extensive and illuminating work on pragmatism, epistemology, hermeneutics, and social and political theory, including Bernstein’s replies to the contributors.

I discuss Robert Brandom’s contention that his “analytic” or “linguistic” pragmatism is, as his book Perspectives on Pragmatism: Classical, Recent, and Contemporary argues, a “way forward from the ideas of American pragmatists.” In this connection, I compare Brandom’s and Dewey’s answers to the demarcation question (how are linguistic practices distinguished from nonlinguistic ones) in order to show that Brandom’s linguistic “exceptionalism” departs from one fundamental contribution of the pragmatic tradition, namely the idea that discursive normativity emerges from previous, already linguistic (...) practices through the development of inquiry as a practical, social achievement (an idea summarized in Dewey’s claim that “logic is a social discipline”). I contend that Dewey’s distinction between two meanings of “language”—as a medium of communication and as an agency of inquiry—puts us in a better position to give an account of how discursive norms came into existence within language, and of what are they good for. (shrink)

We begin by taking “naturalism” in the sense in which P. F. Strawson (“Scepticism, Naturalism and Transcendental Arguments”, 1985) presented Wittgenstein’s anti-sceptical arguments as “naturalistic”. According to Strawson, this naturalism connects the philosophy of Wittgenstein with that of Hume. Then, we proceed to compare Hume’s and Wittgenstein’s positions and establish a tenet common to them, which we qualify as “meta‐philosophical”: philosophy rests on a bedrock that resists our demands of justification, a contingent “so we are, so we act” that is (...) beyond philosophical analysis. But this negative thesis leads to differentcommitments in each philosopher: a commitment with the autonomy of nature in the case of Hume, and a commitment with the autonomy of grammar in the case of Wittgenstein. Next, we analyze the epistemological implications of each commitment, particularly with reference to the status of natural science. We find a deep divergence between Hume and Wittgenstein on this point, so that the former, but not the latter, could still be labelled as “naturalist” in a positive, more substantial sense. Our central point here is the difficulty to give a naturalistic interpretation of such Wittgensteinian notions as “language game” or “form of life”. Finally, we stress that the distance between Hume and Wittgenstein is most clearly evidenced when we consider the normative (moral) implications of Hume’s concept of nature, which are completely absent from Wittgenstein’s approach, this being a feature of Wittgenstein’s philosophy that remained unchanged all along his work. (shrink)

This book compiles 17 short pieces in which the renowned Spanish philosopher and intellectual Fernando Savater (San Sebastián, 1947) evokes the thought and character of George Santayana. The selection spans over more than 30 years – the earliest text was originally published in 1977 and the last one dates from 2010 –, revealing Savater’s sustained interest in, and fondness for the figure of Santayana. Completing the collection of self-contained texts there are two more sections: one of fragme...

This book bears witness to the wide range of topics of philosophical interest in which classical as well as contemporary pragmatist philosophers are involved, or to which they have made durable contributions, or simply on which they have an original word to say. Reading the headings of the six parts that make up this volume – Democracy, Normativity, Religion, Action and Habit, Inquiry, and Ontology and Meaning – one has the feeling that no other philosophical movement of the present can (...) affor... (shrink)